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525 
WHEN OLD BECOMES NEW: RECONCILING THE 
COMMANDS OF THE WILDERNESS ACT AND THE 
NATIONAL HISTORIC PRESERVATION ACT 
 
Nikki C. Carsley 
Abstract: The Wilderness Act created a national framework for 
the protection of wilderness areas. Although the statute defines 
wilderness as an area “untrammeled by man, where man himself is 
a visitor who does not remain,” it leaves room for the “public 
purposes of recreational, scenic, scientific, educational, 
conservation, and historical use.” As such, the Wilderness Act 
clarifies that its purposes are “within and supplemental” to other 
land-use statutes, including statutes like the National Historic 
Preservation Act (NHPA), which created a national scheme for 
preserving historic places and structures. When considering the 
Wilderness Act relative to the NHPA, agencies and courts have 
interpreted agency obligations under each act differently. Though 
the historical context, text, and purpose of each statute indicate that 
historic preservation efforts should be permitted within wilderness 
areas, courts have read the two acts as mutually exclusive and held 
that the Wilderness Act takes precedence over the NHPA. The two 
statutes can be harmonized. To clarify the law in this area, however, 
Congress should amend the Wilderness Act to provide an express 
exception for preservation efforts in compliance with the NHPA. 
INTRODUCTION 
Thousands of tired, nerve-shaken, over-civilized people are beginning 
to find out that going to the mountains is going home; that wildness is a 
necessity; and that mountain parks and reservations are useful not only 
as fountains of timber and irrigating rivers, but as fountains of life.1 
—John Muir 
 
                                                     
1. JOHN MUIR, OUR NATIONAL PARKS 1 (1901). 
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[T]hese old buildings do not belong to us only; . . . they have 
belonged to our forefathers, and they will belong to our descendants 
unless we play them false. They are not in any sense our property, to do 
as we like with. We are only the trustees for those that come after us.2 
—William Morris 
 
Although the American public has long contested the uses and 
purposes of wilderness,3 the concept of an open frontier of wild lands 
has never ceased to be a culturally and historically important aspect of 
America.4 Similarly, while not universally acknowledged, the study of 
history—whether by museum, textbook, or designation of historic 
landmark—has also wielded significant influence on American society.5 
However, in the race to define and protect wilderness lands and historic 
monuments, the respective land-use schemes created by Congress did 
not explicitly account for each other.6 The resulting inconsistencies have 
left agencies and courts alike in a predicament when determining 
whether and how to maintain protected historic structures located within 
designated wilderness areas.7 
Congress enacted the Wilderness Act8 in 1964 against a backdrop of 
competing ideologies regarding the value of wilderness, the rise of 
conservationism, and inter-agency conflict.9 For its time, the Wilderness 
Act was “the most far-reaching land preservation statute ever enacted.”10 
                                                     
2. William Morris, Address at the Society for the Protection of Ancient Buildings Twelfth Annual 
Meeting (July 3, 1889), in SOC’Y FOR THE PROT. OF ANCIENT BLDGS., ANNUAL REPORT 65 (1889). 
3. See generally RODERICK FRAZIER NASH, WILDERNESS AND THE AMERICAN MIND (4th ed. 
2001) (studying the introduction of preservationist thinking amidst the status quo of pro-business 
interests in the context of American wilderness). 
4. See, e.g., HENRY D. THOREAU, EXCURSIONS 202 (Joseph J. Moldenhauer ed., 2007) (“The 
West of which I speak is but another name for the Wild; and what I have been preparing to say is, 
that in Wildness is the preservation of the world.”). 
5. See National Historic Preservation Act, 16 U.S.C. § 470(b) (2006) (“The Congress finds and 
declares that – (1) the spirit and direction of the Nation are founded upon and reflected in its historic 
heritage; (2) the historical and cultural foundations of the Nation should be preserved as a living 
part of our community life and development in order to give a sense of orientation to the American 
people”). See generally SPECIAL COMM. ON HISTORIC PRESERVATION, U.S. CONFERENCE OF 
MAYORS, WITH HERITAGE SO RICH (1966). 
6. The Wilderness Act does not mention the National Historic Preservation Act, and the National 
Historic Preservation Act does not mention the Wilderness Act. 
7. See infra Part III. 
8. Pub. L. No. 88-577, 78 Stat. 890 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131–1136 (2006)). 
9. See Delbert V. Mercure, Jr. & William M. Ross, The Wilderness Act: A Product of 
Congressional Compromise, in CONGRESS AND THE ENVIRONMENT 47, 48–57 (Richard A. Cooley 
& Geoffrey Wandesforde-Smith eds., 1970). 
10. Robert L. Glicksman & George Cameron Coggins, Wilderness in Context, 76 DENV. U. L. 
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Through the creation of the National Wilderness Preservation System,11 
the Wilderness Act established a national framework12 for the protection 
of designated wilderness areas via acts of Congress.13 Since designating 
the inaugural 9.1 million acres of wilderness,14 Congress has added over 
100 million acres to the National Wilderness Preservation System.15 
Today, approximately five percent of the United States is protected as 
wilderness.16 With few exceptions, wilderness legislation has enjoyed 
wide bipartisan support.17 In fact, every president following Lyndon 
Johnson has signed legislation protecting additional wilderness 
acreage.18 
In a similarly conservationist spirit, two years later Congress passed 
the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA).19 The purpose of the 
NHPA was to remedy ineffective federal historic preservation statutes.20 
Like the Wilderness Act, the NHPA was “a watershed in preservation 
law, for it created a means by which the Nation’s preservation goals 
could be achieved.”21 The NHPA promotes the protection of historic 
resources at federal, state, and local levels.22 It authorizes the Secretary 
of the Interior to maintain and expand the National Register of Historic 
Places,23 fosters the development of state, local, tribal, and individual 
                                                     
REV. 383, 387 (1999); see also infra Part I.A. 
11. 16 U.S.C. § 1131(a). 
12. See Mercure & Ross, supra note 9, at 50. 
13. 16 U.S.C. § 1131(a); see also Amy Rashkin et al., The State of the Law: The Wilderness Act 
of 1964: A Practitioner’s Guide, 21 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 219, 222–23 (2001); infra 
Parts I.A., I.B. 
14. See infra text accompanying note 63. 
15. Fast Facts, WILDERNESS.NET, http://www.wilderness.net/NWPS/fastfacts (last visited Apr. 
26, 2013). 
16. Id. 
17. Peter A. Appel, Wilderness, the Courts, and the Effect of Politics on Judicial Decisionmaking, 
35 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 275, 290 (2011). 
18. Id. 
19. Pub. L. No. 89-665, 80 Stat. 915 (1966) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 470–470x(6) 
(2006)). 
20. See ADINA W. KANEFIELD, ADVISORY COUNCIL ON HISTORIC PRES., FEDERAL HISTORIC 
PRESERVATION CASE LAW, 1966–1996: THIRTY YEARS OF THE NATIONAL HISTORIC 
PRESERVATION ACT 3 (1996), available at http://www.preservationnation.org/information-
center/law-and-policy/legal-resources/preservation-law-101/resources/ACHP-FHPCL-1996-1996-
Part-1.pdf (“Although Federal statutes containing preservation policies have existed since the turn 
of the 20th century, these laws typically were limited in scope and lacked effective means of 
enforcement.”). 
21. Id. 
22. See infra notes 23–26. 
23. 16 U.S.C. § 470a(a)(1)(A). 
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preservation programs through administrative requirements24 and federal 
grants,25 and establishes the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation, 
an independent federal agency.26 The Act has enjoyed bipartisan support, 
and Congress has enacted several amendments to the NHPA,27 each 
serving to strengthen its protection of historic sites.28 Since the NHPA’s 
enactment, Congress has also enhanced federal historic preservation 
policy in several other statutes.29 Currently, more than eighty thousand 
properties are listed on the National Register of Historic Places.30 
However, neither the Wilderness Act nor the NHPA specifies whether 
wilderness protection or historic preservation should take precedence 
when the two values conflict.31 Although the Wilderness Act purports to 
be “within and supplemental” to other land-use statutes,32 courts have 
consistently interpreted the Wilderness Act to preclude historic 
preservation efforts undertaken by agencies and the public.33 As a result, 
a court decision can strip a nationally significant historic structure 
located within wilderness land of its federal historic protection and leave 
it to deteriorate or be removed entirely.34 
                                                     
24. Id. §§ 470a(b)–470a(d). 
25. Id. § 470e. 
26. Id. § 470i. See generally KANEFIELD, supra note 20. 
27. See, e.g., NHPA Amendments of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-453, 120 Stat. 3367 (codified as 
amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 470 note, 470h, 470i, 470m, 470t, 470v-2 (2006)); NHPA Amendments of 
1980, Pub. L. No. 96-515, 94 Stat. 2987 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 469c–2, 470–1, 
470a–1, 470a–2, 470h–2, 470h–3, 470u to 470w, 470w–1 to 470w-6 (2006)); NHPA Amendments 
of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-222, 90 Stat. 1230 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 470a(e)(1)–
470a(e)(2) (2006)). 
28. See KANEFIELD, supra note 20, at 7 (“The [NHPA] has been amended several times since its 
inception in 1966, each time strengthening and clarifying various aspects of the law.”). 
29. See id. at 3. 
30. National Register of Historic Places Program: About Us, NAT’L PARK SERVICE, 
http://www.nps.gov/nr/about.htm (last visited Apr. 12, 2013). 
31. See infra Part III. 
32. 16 U.S.C. § 1133(a) (2006); see also Rashkin et al., supra note 13, at 233–34; infra note 87 
and accompanying text. 
33. See, e.g., Wilderness Watch v. Mainella, 375 F.3d 1085 (11th Cir. 2004) (invalidating Park 
Service’s use of motor-vehicle transport across wilderness to provide tourist access to historic sites); 
Wilderness Watch v. Iwamoto, 853 F. Supp. 2d 1063 (W.D. Wash. 2012) (invalidating Forest 
Service and public’s rebuilding of historic structure within wilderness); High Sierra Hikers Ass’n v. 
U.S. Forest Serv., 436 F. Supp. 2d 1117 (E.D. Cal. 2006) (invalidating Forest Service’s decision to 
maintain and repair historic structures within wilderness); Olympic Park Assocs. v. Mainella, No. 
C04-5732FDB, 2005 WL 1871114 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 1, 2005) (invalidating Park Service’s 
reconstruction of historic structures within wilderness); see also Peter A. Appel, Wilderness and the 
Courts, 29 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 62 (2010) (using statistical analysis to evaluate limited amount of 
successful challenges to the Wilderness Act); infra Part III. 
34. See, e.g., Iwamoto, 853 F. Supp. 2d at 1077–79 (ordering Forest Service to remove Green 
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As opposed to the trend of lower and appellate court interpretations 
that preference the Wilderness Act’s commands over those of the 
NHPA,35 this Comment argues that the Wilderness Act should be 
reconciled with the NHPA so as to ensure that historic structures within 
wilderness areas be preserved. Part I explores the historical context of 
the Wilderness Act’s enactment, as well as its purposes and text. Part II 
discusses the same aspects of the NHPA. Part III reviews three lower 
court decisions that have grappled with the conflicts between the 
Wilderness Act and the NHPA. Part IV makes two arguments. First, 
long-standing canons of statutory interpretation compel the 
harmonization of the Wilderness Act with the NHPA. Second, because 
courts are not harmonizing the two statutes, Congress should clarify this 
area of the law by amending the Wilderness Act to explicitly provide for 
historic preservation activities within wilderness areas. 
I.  THE WILDERNESS ACT’S HISTORICAL CONTEXT, 
PURPOSE, AND TEXT REFLECT COMPROMISE 
Prior to the passage of the Wilderness Act, protection of wild lands 
was haphazard and depended on agency willpower.36 However, once the 
conservation movement gained a foothold in American political 
ideology,37 the first comprehensive approach to wilderness protection 
was undertaken, which culminated eight years later in the passage of the 
Wilderness Act.38 The political history and language of the bill 
demonstrate that its ultimate success was the result of compromise and 
bipartisanship.39 For example, the final version of the bill only 
permanently designated as wilderness about sixty percent of land that 
was previously classified as wilderness and primitive areas40 and 
removed agency authority to designate wilderness areas.41 Moreover, the 
                                                     
Mountain lookout, which is listed on National Register of Historic Places, from Glacier Peak 
Wilderness). But see Wilderness Watch v. Iwamoto, No. C10–1797–JCC, 2012 WL 6766551 (W.D. 
Wash. Sept. 20, 2012) (granting Forest Service’s motion to alter or amend judgment). 
35. See cases cited supra note 33. 
36. See generally Glicksman & Coggins, supra note 10, at 384–86. 
37. See id. at 385; see also Michael McCloskey, What the Wilderness Act Accomplished in 
Protection of Roadless Areas Within the National Park System, 10 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 455, 461 
(1995). See generally NASH, supra note 3. 
38. See Michael McCloskey, The Wilderness Act of 1964: Its Background and Meaning, 45 OR. 
L. REV. 288, 288 (1966); Mercure & Ross, supra note 9, at 52–53. 
39. See Mercure & Ross, supra note 9, at 58–59. 
40. See id. at 57–60. 
41. See NASH, supra note 3, at 225–26; Rashkin et al., supra note 13, at 223. 
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Wilderness Act clarified that its aims are “within and supplemental” to 
other land-use legislation (including historic preservation statutes)42 and 
specified that, in addition to conservation, the purposes of wilderness 
areas also include “recreational,” “scenic,” “scientific,” and “historic 
use.”43 The Wilderness Act also contains numerous exceptions for 
private rights and established and special uses, even for activities such as 
mining and aircraft use.44 
A.  The History of the Wilderness Act’s Enactment Demonstrates 
Concession and Cooperation from Both Wilderness Advocates and 
Opponents 
Before the Wilderness Act’s enactment, federal land-use policy varied 
according to the administering agency, lacking any uniform purpose.45 
The earliest federal effort to protect wilderness occurred with the 
creation of the national park system.46 However, wilderness protection 
was not the first priority of those managing the national parks.47 The 
                                                     
42. 16 U.S.C. § 1133(a) (2006). 
43. Id. § 1133(b). 
44. Id. §§ 1133(c)–(d). 
45. See generally Glicksman & Coggins, supra note 10, at 384–86. At the time of the country’s 
founding, the federal government owned over two billion acres of land. Id. at 384. Until the 1930s, 
federal land-use policy was that of “disposition,” in which Congress gave veterans, homesteaders, 
ranchers, miners, states, and railroads land at little to no cost to promote economic development. Id. 
However, as the federal government’s remaining land holdings became increasingly unattractive to 
prospective purchasers, see id., and the conservation movement gained momentum, see NASH, 
supra note 3, passim, federal agencies acquired jurisdiction over federal lands and managed them 
according to various statutory mandates, see Jan G. Laitos & Rachael B. Gamble, The Problem with 
Wilderness, 32 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 503, 554 n.305 (2008) (“The Forest Service has regulated 
wild lands within national forests pursuant to the Organic Act of 1897, 15 U.S.C. § 473 (2000); the 
Multiple Use Sustained Yield Act of 1960, 16 U.S.C. §§ 528–531; and the [National Forest 
Management Act], [i]d. §§ 1600–1614.”). 
46. See Mercure & Ross, supra note 9, at 52. The first national parks were Yosemite National 
Park (established in 1864) and Yellowstone National Park (established in 1872). McCloskey, supra 
note 38, at 295 n.29. 
47. See McCloskey, supra note 38, at 296 (“Eventually master plans were prepared for national 
parks showing the ultimate limit of planned developments, but in the framework of this planning, 
wilderness seemed to be viewed mainly as the land left over in planning. Rather than being 
positively identified as a value in its own right, wilderness became the residuum in master 
planning.”). The purposes of national parks and national forests are very different: whereas the Park 
Service is to manage national parks so as “to conserve the scenery and the natural and historic 
objects and the wild life therein and to provide for the enjoyment of the same in such manner and by 
such means as will leave them unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations,” 16 U.S.C. § 1 
(2006), the Forest Service is to manage national forests for multiple uses, see, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 475 
(2006) (“No national forest shall be established, except to improve and protect the forest within the 
boundaries, or for the purpose of securing favorable conditions of water flows, and to furnish a 
continuous supply of timber for the use and necessities of citizens of the United States . . . .”). For a 
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Park Service did not systematically designate wilderness areas and often 
gave precedence to the demands of recreation.48 The Forest Service was 
the first agency to designate wilderness areas in national forests for the 
purpose of wilderness protection.49 While its conservation efforts were 
laudable, the Forest Service’s designation of wilderness areas was in fact 
part of a larger turf battle between the two agencies.50 The Forest Service 
also often caved in to business interests by declassifying formerly 
designated wilderness areas.51 
By the end of World War II, the conservation movement had 
established its legitimacy and was beginning to gain political 
acceptance.52 In response to proposed developments in wilderness 
areas,53 Howard Zahniser of the Wilderness Society and other 
conservationists began their campaign to establish a national system of 
wilderness protection.54 Together, Zahniser, the Sierra Club, the 
National Parks Association, the National Wildlife Federation, and the 
Wildlife Management Institute wrote a draft bill.55 In 1956, Senator 
Hubert Humphrey and eight other senators introduced the first 
wilderness legislation.56 
As a conservation statute, the Wilderness Act (both in its drafted and 
                                                     
more detailed discussion of the differences between national parks and national forests and the 
resulting impact on wilderness lands, see River of No Return: National Parks, National Forests, and 
U.S. Wildernesses, P.B.S., http://www.pbs.org/wnet/nature/episodes/river-of-no-return/national-
parks-national-forests-and-u-s-wildernesses/7667/ (last visited Mar. 7, 2013). 
48. See Mercure & Ross, supra note 9, at 49–50, 52. 
49. See McCloskey, supra note 38, at 296. 
50. Mercure & Ross, supra note 9, at 52 (“[T]he move in this direction by the Forest Service 
was . . . a defensive and bureaucratic one aimed at preventing the continued take-over of choice 
scenic and recreation lands by the Park Service for the establishment of new national parks.”); 
Rashkin et al., supra note 13, at 224. 
51. Mercure & Ross, supra note 9, at 50. Additionally, each agency managed its lands internally 
with little oversight, which prevented public review of decisions about wilderness protection and 
allowed politics to play a large role in the process. See id. at 49–50; John D. Leshy, Contemporary 
Politics of Wilderness Preservation, 25 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 1, 1–2 (2005). 
52. See Glicksman & Coggins, supra note 10, at 385. See generally NASH, supra note 3. 
53. See Mercure & Ross, supra note 9, at 52 (proposed activities included logging, mining, and 
establishment of dams, reservoirs, and tramways). 
54. See id. at 52–53; see also Jedediah Purdy, The Politics of Nature: Climate Change, 
Environmental Law, and Democracy, 119 YALE L.J. 1122, 1170–73 (2010) (discussing Zahniser 
and other environmentalists’ impact on congressional debates regarding the Wilderness Act). 
55. See Mercure & Ross, supra note 9, at 53. For an exhaustive discussion of the legislative 
history of the Wilderness Act, see Jack M. Hession, The Legislative History of the Wilderness Act 
(July 1967) (unpublished M.A. thesis, San Diego State College) (on file with San Diego State 
University Library). 
56. S. 4013, 84th Cong. (1956); 102 CONG. REC. 9,772–83 (1956); see also McCloskey, supra 
note 38, at 298. 
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final form) was unprecedented in its scope and content.57 Congress held 
nine separate hearings on the legislation, totaling over six thousand 
pages of testimony and sixty-six modifications or resubmissions.58 
Opposed by the Forest Service, the National Park Service, and business 
interests, the original bill removed the Forest Service’s authority to 
adjust wilderness areas, protected national forests against mining and 
hydropower projects, and required the designation of additional 
wilderness areas.59 The Forest Service supported the bill once the agency 
successfully amended it to both eliminate the proposed National 
Wilderness Preservation Council60 and permit mining, reservoirs, power 
plants, and roads in wilderness, if the President deemed such 
developments in the national interest.61 Once the bill removed any 
reference to Indian reservations, it won the executive branch’s 
endorsement.62 In addition to the Forest Service and the President’s 
amendments, the final weakened version of the bill, enacted eight years 
after its introduction, required additions to the National Wilderness 
Preservation System to be completed via congressional acts (rather than 
by presidential initiative or agency discretion) and permitted certain 
mining exploration and development, power projects, and livestock 
grazing.63 Ultimately, Congress attempted to “preserve pristine areas 
                                                     
57. See NASH, supra note 3, at 222 (“Congress lavished more time and effort on the wilderness 
bill than on any other measure in American conservation history.”); see also supra text 
accompanying note 10. 
58. NASH, supra note 3, at 222. One environmental law scholar identifies the most important 
congressional bills as: S. 4, 88th Cong. (1963); H.R. 930, 9070, 9162, 88th Cong. (1963); H.R. 293, 
87th Cong. (1962); S. 174, 87th Cong. (1961); H.R. 776, 1925, 87th Cong. (1961); S. 3809, 86th 
Cong. (1960); H.R. 12951, 86th Cong. (1960); S. 1123, 86th Cong. (1959); H.R. 713, 86th Cong. 
(1959); S. 4028, 85th Cong. (1958); H.R. 13013, 85th Cong. (1958); S. 1176, 85th Cong. (1957); 
H.R. 3611, 85th Cong. (1957); S. 4013, 84th Cong. (1956); H.R. 11703, 84th Cong. (1956). 
McCloskey, supra note 38, at 298 n.40. 
59. S. 4013, 84th Cong. (1956); CRAIG W. ALLIN, THE POLITICS OF WILDERNESS PRESERVATION 
106–07 (1st ed. 1982). 
60. Federal administrators and citizen conservationists would have comprised this advisory 
council, which was to study wilderness and recommend maintenance activities and system 
expansion. See NASH, supra note 3, at 221. 
61. See The Wilderness Act: Hearings on S. 174 Before the Comm. on Interior and Insular 
Affairs, 87th Cong. 42–57 (1961) (statements of Richard E. McArdle, Chief, Edward C. Crafts, 
Assistant Chief, & Reynolds G. Florance, Director, Division of Legislative Reporting and Liason, 
Forest Service); ALLIN, supra note 59, at 116–18; McCloskey, supra note 38, at 298–99. 
62. See McCloskey, supra note 38, at 298–99; see also Mercure & Ross, supra note 9, at 54. One 
of the early draft bills would have established wilderness areas on Indian reservations subject to the 
consent of the tribal council. S. 4013, 84th Cong. (1956); see also ALLIN, supra note 59, at 107. The 
Department of the Interior opposed this provision because it was at odds with tribal self-
government. See Hession, supra note 55, at 46–51. 
63. S. 4, 88th Cong. (1963); Pub. L. No. 88-577, 78 Stat. 890 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. 
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from development and yet avoid economic harm to local communities 
and development interests.”64 
B.  The Wilderness Act’s Implementation Reveals Congressional 
Trade-Offs 
The overarching purpose of the Wilderness Act and the goal of its 
supporters was to create a national policy for wilderness protection.65 
The Wilderness Act’s preamble provides, “[I]t is hereby declared to be 
the policy of the Congress to secure for the American people of present 
and future generations the benefits of an enduring resource of 
wilderness.”66 To that end, the Wilderness Act established a uniform 
National Wilderness Preservation System.67 However, members of 
Congress and the Forest Service eliminated an early proposal to create a 
national management body,68 the National Wilderness Preservation 
Council.69 Instead, the Wilderness Act leaves the management of 
wilderness areas to the agency originally responsible for that land70 and 
                                                     
§§ 1131–1136 (2006)); see also NASH, supra note 3, at 225–26; Mercure & Ross, supra note 9, at 
59–60 (“The final legislation establishing the National Wilderness [Preservation] System must be 
considered a compromise; but it may also be said that the economic interests gained rather more 
than they were forced to give up.”). Of the 14.6 million acres of land previously classified as 
wilderness and primitive areas, the bill included only 9.1 million acres of wilderness in the National 
Wilderness Preservation System. Mercure & Ross, supra note 9,.at 57, 60. The Wilderness Act left 
the remaining 5.5 million acres of primitive areas, as well as about sixty million acres of wild and 
roadless portions of the national park system and national wildlife refuges and game ranges, to a 
ten-year review period by the Secretary of Agriculture and Secretary of the Interior respectively. Id. 
64. Daniel Rohlf & Douglas L. Honnold, Managing the Balances of Nature: The Legal 
Framework of Wilderness Management, 15 ECOLOGY L.Q. 249, 257 (1988). Both the House and 
Senate reports accompanying the final bill acknowledged that the Wilderness Act carved out a place 
for business interests. See S. REP. NO. 88-109, at 246 (1963) (“Serious consideration has been given 
to the various competitive uses. Provisions have been included in the bill for future modifications in 
the wilderness system, or in regulations governing specific areas . . . Congress itself can at any time 
enact legislation making changes.”); H.R. REP. NO. 88-1538, at 93 (1964) (“In those areas 
designated as ‘wilderness’ grazing would be permitted where previously established . . . . Specific 
provision is made for performance of commercial services ‘to the extent necessary for activities 
which are proper for realizing the recreational or other wilderness purposes’ of the areas 
concerned.”). 
65. See NASH, supra note 3, at 220–22; Rashkin et al., supra note 13, at 222. 
66. 16 U.S.C. § 1131(a) (emphasis added). 
67. Id. 
68. See S. 4, 88th Cong. (1963); H.R. 930, 88th Cong. (1963); H.R. 9070, 88th Cong. (1963); 
H.R. 9162, 88th Cong. (1963); H.R. 293, 87th Cong. (1962); Rashkin et al., supra note 13, at 224. 
69. See supra note 60. 
70. 16 U.S.C. § 1131(b) (“The inclusion of an area in the National Wilderness Preservation 
System notwithstanding, the area shall continue to be managed by the Department and agency 
having jurisdiction thereover immediately before its inclusion in the National Wilderness 
 
12 - Carsley Article.docx (Do Not Delete) 6/17/2013  1:58 PM 
534 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 88:525 
 
directs that agency “to provide for the protection of these areas [and] the 
preservation of their wilderness character.”71 
In addition to its lack of a national oversight body for the newly 
created national wilderness protection scheme, the Wilderness Act also 
restricts the designation of new wilderness areas to congressional 
action.72 The Wilderness Act’s opponents removed the authority of 
federal agencies to designate wilderness areas and vested that authority 
exclusively with Congress.73 According to the preamble, “[N]o Federal 
lands shall be designated as ‘wilderness areas’ except as provided for in 
this chapter or by a subsequent Act.”74 Through requiring congressional 
action to designate additional wilderness areas, the Act prevents 
individual agencies from classifying or declassifying wilderness areas at 
the behest of the executive or Congress with little public scrutiny75 and 
appears to embrace a national approach to wilderness protection. In 
practice, this requirement “deliberately created a cumbersome system of 
government bureau reviews, local public hearings, [c]ongressional 
committee reviews, and finally a separate act of Congress for each 
addition.”76 While statutorily designated wilderness areas are no longer 
threatened by election cycles,77 “[h]ardly a more tedious, time-
consuming, and obstructive method could have been devised.”78 
Thus, although wilderness protection has enjoyed longstanding 
bipartisan support79 (evidenced by the National Wilderness Preservation 
System’s over twelve-fold acreage expansion since 1964),80 this 
                                                     
Preservation System unless otherwise provided by Act of Congress.”). 
71. Id. § 1131(a). 
72. See NASH, supra note 3, at 222 (“Previously, preservation policy in the National Forests had 
been only an administrative decision subject to change at any time by Forest Service personnel. 
Even the laws creating National Parks and Monuments deliberately left the way open for the 
construction of roads and tourist accommodations. The intention of the wilderness bill, however, 
was to make any alteration of wilderness conditions within the system illegal.”). 
73. See, e.g., id. at 225–26; Rashkin et al., supra note 13, at 223. 
74. 16 U.S.C. § 1131(a). 
75. NASH, supra note 3, at 226; Mercure & Ross, supra note 9, at 52–53, 55, 60–61; Rashkin et 
al., supra note 13, at 222–23. 
76. NASH, supra note 3, at 226. 
77. Id. at 222; Rashkin et al., supra note 13, at 223. 
78. Mercure & Ross, supra note 9, at 60. 
79. Appel, supra note 33, at 65. On March 30, 2009, President Obama joined every 
administration since Lyndon Johnson to sign legislation adding wilderness areas to the National 
Wilderness Preservation System with the Omnibus Public Land Management Act of 2009, Pub. L. 
No. 111-11, 125 Stat. 991 (2009) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 16 U.S.C. and 43 
U.S.C.). Appel, supra note 33, at 65 n.10.  
80. Fast Facts, supra note 15. 
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expansion is by way of multi-million-acre wilderness bills because of the 
political process involved.81 Most wilderness-designation acts package 
wilderness areas by land management agency or by state.82 Though 
Congress’s wilderness protection efforts are impressive, much wild land 
remains outside of the Wilderness Act’s protections:83 “[e]stimates vary, 
but it is fair to say that as much federal land as is already in the 
system . . . is, although not now in the system, currently wild enough to 
qualify for it.”84 Today, some observers blame the cumbersome process 
of wilderness designation and economic, political, and internal 
congressional pressures for the fact that Congress no longer designates 
vast land tracts as wilderness areas, even asserting that “wilderness 
designation by Congress has largely come to an end.”85 
C.  The Wilderness Act’s Text Expressly Balances Interests Other than 
Conservation 
Rather than create an inexorable command to protect wilderness 
above all else, Congress openly declared its intent that the Wilderness 
Act “preserve[] the integrity of several statutes governing national 
forests and national parks . . . .”86 Accordingly, the Wilderness Act states 
that its purposes are “within and supplemental to the purposes for which 
national forests and units of the national park and national wildlife 
refuge systems are established and administered.”87 To achieve this 
objective, the Wilderness Act enumerates specific statutes with which it 
does not interfere.88 These statutes include certain organic acts of the 
                                                     
81. Leshy, supra note 51, at 3. 
82. Id. 
83. Id. at 4. 
84. Id. 
85. Laitos & Gamble, supra note 45, at 534–37 (noting that recreation and business lobbies, as 
well as limited experience with wilderness designation among current members of Congress, have 
deterred Congress from keeping pace with its previous wilderness designations). The 112th 
Congress was the first Congress since 1966 not to designate any wilderness areas. Congress 
Adjourns, Leaving Unfinished Business, THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS (Jan. 15, 2013), 
http://www.pewenvironment.org/news-room/other-resources/congress-adjourns-leaving-unfinished-
business-85899443035#. 
86. H.R. REP. NO. 88-1538, at 13 (1964). 
87. 16 U.S.C. § 1133(a) (2006); see also McCloskey, supra note 38, at 302–03; Rashkin et al., 
supra note 13, at 233–34 (“Congress’[s] clear objective in passing the [Wilderness] Act was to 
create a law that was ‘within’ and ‘supplemental’ to other acts, but also established national forests 
and wilderness areas for the preservation and enjoyment of the public. . . . Ultimately, the 
[Wilderness] Act expands Congress’[s] commitment to the preservation of public lands with 
wilderness qualities without modifying the authority of previous acts of Congress.”). 
88. 16 U.S.C. § 1133(a). 
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Forest Service and National Park Service, legislation managing the 
Superior National Forest in Minnesota, the authority of the Federal 
Power Commission to license power development, and the major federal 
historic preservation statutes existing in 1964.89 
However, scholars have observed that the purposes of the statutes 
exempted from the Wilderness Act seem to conflict with the Act’s 
defining conservation mandates.90 For instance, the exempted Organic 
Administration Act91 provides that national forests will be established to 
support irrigation, as well as provide a reliable timber supply for the 
American public.92 Similarly, the exempted Multiple-Use Sustained-
Yield Act of June 12, 196093 states that national forests will also provide 
“outdoor recreation, range, timber, watershed, and wildlife and 
fish . . . .”94 By contrast, under the Wilderness Act, wilderness areas 
(which include national forests) “shall be administered for the use and 
enjoyment of the American people in such manner as will leave them 
unimpaired for future use and enjoyment as wilderness . . . .”95 
Importantly, the statutes exempted from the Wilderness Act also 
include early historic preservation statutes96 that were forerunners to the 
NHPA. Section 1133(a) of the Wilderness Act in particular “reveals 
Congress’[s] efforts to supplement and be within previous land 
preservation acts.”97 For example, this section exempts the Antiquities 
Act of 1906,98 which regulates the excavation and examination of 
                                                     
89. Id.; see also McCloskey, supra note 38, at 302–03; Rashkin et al., supra note 13, at 232–37. 
90. See generally ROSS W. GORTE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41649, WILDERNESS LAWS: 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS AND PROHIBITED AND PERMITTED USES (2011), available at 
http://www.wilderness.net/NWPS/documents/Wilderness%20LawsStatutory%20Provisions%20and
%20Prohibited%20and%20Permitted%20Uses.pdf; Elinor Colbourn, The Morality of Wilderness: 
Federal Reserved Water Rights in Western Wilderness Areas, 6 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 157, 164–69 
(1988); McCloskey, supra note 38, at 305–14; Rashkin et al., supra note 13, at 232–36. 
91. Sundry Civil Appropriations Act of 1897, ch. 2, 30 Stat. 11, 34–35 (1897) (codified as 
amended at 16 U.S.C. § 475 (2006)). Section 1133(a)(1) of the Wilderness Act exempts the Organic 
Administration Act from the Wilderness Act. 
92. 16 U.S.C. § 475. 
93. Pub. L. No. 86-517, 74 Stat. 215 (1960) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 528–31 
(2006)). Section 1133(a)(1) of the Wilderness Act exempts the Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield Act 
from the Wilderness Act. 
94. 16 U.S.C. § 528. 
95. Id. § 1131(a) (emphasis added). 
96. See id. § 1133(a)(3). 
97. Rashkin et al., supra note 13, at 236. 
98. Act of June 8, 1906, ch. 3060, 34 Stat. 225 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 431–33 
(2006)). 
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archeological digs and ruins and the collection of historic objects.99 It 
also exempts from the Wilderness Act the Historic Sites, Buildings and 
Antiquities Act,100 which declares as national policy the preservation of 
historic sites, buildings, and nationally significant objects.101 Although 
the Wilderness Act does not mention the NHPA specifically,102 the Act 
recognizes the NHPA’s statutory authority by reference insofar as the 
Act “in no manner lower[s] the standards . . . [of] any other [a]ct of 
Congress which might pertain to or affect such [wilderness] area, 
including, but not limited to,” the historic preservation statutes 
mentioned above.103 
Additionally, the Wilderness Act’s definition of wilderness and its 
express purposes leave room for uses of wilderness areas beyond 
conservation, so that the Act’s definitions and directives appear to 
conflict.104 Although wilderness is defined as “an area of undeveloped 
Federal land retaining its primeval character and influence, without 
permanent improvements or human habitation”105 and “where the earth 
and its community of life are untrammeled by man, where man himself 
is a visitor who does not remain,”106 the Act declares that wilderness 
areas “may also contain ecological, geological, or other features of 
scientific, educational, scenic, or historical value.”107 Somewhat 
redundantly, the Wilderness Act further declares that “wilderness areas 
shall be devoted to the public purposes of recreational, scenic, scientific, 
educational, conservation, and historical use.”108 In a decision 
interpreting the Wilderness Act, the Ninth Circuit recognized the 
difficultly of reconciling the competing demands of the Act’s broad 
purposes with its very restrictive definition of wilderness: 
Read as a whole, the [Wilderness] Act gives conflicting policy 
directives to the [United States Fish and Wildlife] Service in 
administering the area. The Service is “charged with 
                                                     
99. 16 U.S.C. § 432. 
100. Act of August 21, 1935, ch. 593, 49 Stat. 666 (codified as amended at 16. U.S.C. §§ 461–67 
(2006)). 
101. 16 U.S.C. § 461. 
102. This omission (and subsequent lack of amendment) may be an artifact of history as the 
NHPA was not enacted until two years after the passage of the Wilderness Act. See supra text 
accompanying notes 8, 19. 
103. 16 U.S.C. § 1133(a)(3) (2006) (emphasis added). 
104. See id. §§ 1131(c), 1133(b). 
105. Id. § 1131(c). 
106. Id. 
107. Id. § 1131(c)(4) (emphasis added). 
108. Id. § 1133(b) (emphasis added). 
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maintaining the wilderness character of the land, providing 
opportunities for wilderness recreation, managing fire and insect 
risk, and even facilitating mineral extraction activities.” It is 
charged with simultaneously devoting the land to “conservation” 
and protecting and preserving the wilderness in its natural 
condition. We cannot discern an unambiguous instruction to the 
Service. Rather, those competing instructions call for the 
application of judgment and discretion.109 
Finally, even though wilderness areas are supposed to be largely 
without human improvement or influence, the Wilderness Act includes 
some fairly broad exceptions.110 For example, the Wilderness Act’s 
prohibition on commercial enterprises and permanent roads is subject to 
existing private rights.111 Similarly, if “necessary to meet minimum 
requirements for the administration of the [wilderness] area,” temporary 
roads, motorized vehicles and equipment (including automobiles, 
motorboats, aircraft, and mechanical transport), and structures or 
installations are permitted within wilderness areas.112 Moreover, special 
provisions exist for aircraft, motorboats, fire, insect and disease control, 
mining and mineral activities, water infrastructure, livestock grazing, 
commercial services, state fish and wildlife management, and access to 
private- and state-owned land surrounded by wilderness.113 
II.  WITH THE NHPA, CONGRESS ESTABLISHED STRONG 
PROTECTIONS FOR HISTORIC PROPERTIES 
Although solitary efforts on federal, state, and local levels to protect 
historic sites existed well before the enactment of the NHPA,114 the 
                                                     
109. Wilderness Watch, Inc. v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 629 F.3d 1024, 1033 (9th Cir. 2010) 
(internal citations omitted) (finding that conservation of bighorn sheep was a historical purpose 
consistent with the Wilderness Act); see also High Sierra Hikers Ass’n v. Blackwell, 390 F.3d 630, 
647–48 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Although we believe that Congress intended to enshrine the long-term 
preservation of wilderness areas as the ultimate goal of the [Wilderness] Act, the diverse, and 
sometimes conflicting list of responsibilities imposed on administering agencies renders Congress’s 
intent arguably ambiguous.”). 
110. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. §§ 1133(c), 1133(d), 1134. For a detailed discussion of the Wilderness 
Act’s permitted non-conforming uses, see GORTE, supra note 90, at 10–15. 
111. 16 U.S.C. § 1133(c). 
112. Id. Neither Congress nor any federal agency has defined the minimum requirements to allow 
motorized access and infrastructure. GORTE, supra note 90, at 10. 
113. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1133(d), 1134. 
114. See generally CHRISTOPHER J. DUERKSEN, A HANDBOOK ON HISTORIC PRESERVATION LAW 
6 (1983); CHARLES B. HOSMER, JR., PRESENCE OF THE PAST: A HISTORY OF THE PRESERVATION 
MOVEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES BEFORE WILLIAMSBURG (1965). 
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NHPA marked the first comprehensive national attempt to protect 
historic properties.115 Central to its framework, the NHPA establishes 
collaborative partnerships at all levels of government that foster historic 
protection through the development and promotion of the National 
Register of Historic Places.116 Since the NHPA’s enactment, Congress 
has strengthened its protections numerous times117 without exceptions 
for other types of land-use protections. Though the purpose of each 
amendment does not appear to be settled,118 much of the legislative 
history evinces a congressional intent to elucidate and strengthen federal 
agencies’ historic preservation responsibilities.119 
A. The Context of the NHPA’s Enactment and Its Subsequent 
Amendments Illustrate Congress’s Increasing Protection of 
Historic Properties 
Though there have been isolated efforts to protect historic sites 
associated with important people or events since the turn of the twentieth 
century,120 the 1960s marked the launch of a nationwide preservation 
movement that culminated in the enactment of the NHPA.121 For 
example, in 1964, the U.S. Conference of Mayors began a study of 
domestic historic preservation policies and identified public demand for 
a national approach to the preservation of historic sites, which it 
ultimately recommended that Congress adopt.122 Moreover, by 1964, 
                                                     
115. See KANEFIELD, supra note 20, at 3. 
116. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 470(b), 470(a) (2006). 
117. See infra notes 129–37 and accompanying text. 
118. See infra note 148. 
119. See infra Part II.C. 
120. See generally HOSMER, supra note 114. The first federal statute was the Antiquities Act of 
1906, 16 U.S.C. §§ 431–433 (2006), which authorized the President to designate historic sites as 
national monuments and required permits for archeological activities on federal lands. Id. Given the 
Act’s limited scope, Congress enacted the Historic Sites Act of 1935, id. §§ 461–467 (2006), which 
declared a national policy of historic preservation and vested responsibility of such preservation 
with the Secretary of the Interior. Id. However, even with this limited federal effort for preservation, 
state and local preservation laws were sparse. See DUERKSEN, supra note 114, at 6 (describing 1956 
survey of local preservation laws that found that only a “handful of cities had enacted laws: 
Alexandria, Virginia (1946); Williamsburg, Virginia (1947); Winston-Salem, North Carolina 
(1948); Georgetown in Washington, D.C. (1950); Natchez, Mississippi (1951); Annapolis, 
Maryland (1951); Beacon Hill in Boston and Nantucket, Massachusetts (1955); and Salem, 
Massachusetts (1956)”); see also 3 PATRICIA E. SALKIN, AM. L. ZONING § 27:1 (5th ed. 2012) 
(“Local preservation laws were not adopted as quickly as general zoning ordinances, however, and 
by the mid 1950s only a few cities had enacted historic preservation ordinances.”). 
121. See 3 SALKIN, supra note 120. 
122. See SPECIAL COMM. ON HISTORIC PRESERVATION, U.S. CONFERENCE OF MAYORS, supra 
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more than forty states had established historic preservation policies.123 
These efforts resulted in the passage of the NHPA in 1966, which 
created a partnership between federal agencies and states to coordinate 
historic preservation via the National Register of Historic Places.124 To 
effectively create a national framework for historic preservation, the 
NHPA established the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation.125 The 
Council advises the President and Congress on historic preservation 
issues, recommends measures to coordinate public and private local, 
state, and federal preservation efforts, and participates in the review of 
agency action that impacts historic properties.126 The NHPA also 
authorized grants to state and local governments and Indian tribes for 
historic preservation surveys and projects.127 The grants were 
administered by state liaison officers (later known as state historic 
preservation officers) for the National Park Service.128 
While the Wilderness Act has remained largely unchanged since its 
enactment, Congress has amended the NHPA several times to strengthen 
its mandates129 and has supplemented it with environmental and 
transportation laws that contain preservation obligations.130 In 1976, the 
                                                     
note 5, at 220–21. 
123. See DUERKSEN, supra note 114, at 8. 
124. See supra text accompanying note 122; see also 16 U.S.C. §§ 470(b), 470a (2006). 
125. 16 U.S.C. § 470i. 
126. Id. §§ 470j, 470f. The NHPA’s review process is described in infra Part II.B. 
127. 16 U.S.C. § 470a. 
128. THOMAS F. KING, CULTURAL RESOURCE LAWS & PRACTICE 19, 24, 373 (3d ed. 2008); see 
also 16 U.S.C. § 470a. 
129. See KANEFIELD, supra note 20, at 5–7; supra notes 27–28 and accompanying text; infra 
notes 131–37 and accompanying text. 
130. See, e.g., Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-574, 80 Stat. 766 (codified as 
amended at 23 U.S.C. §§ 137–138 (2006)); National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No 
91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4347 (2006)); Intermodal Surface 
Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-240, 105 Stat. 1914 (codified as amended at 
15 U.S.C. §§ 3711(b), 3711(c); 16 U.S.C. § 1262; 23 U.S.C. §§ 133, 153, 160, 303, 325, 326; 26 
U.S.C. § 9511; 33 U.S.C. §§ 59cc, 59dd; 49 U.S.C. §§ 111, 309 (2006)). Unlike the Wilderness Act, 
the executive branch has also supplemented the NHPA through various executive orders. For 
example, in 1971, President Nixon signed Executive Order No. 11,593, 36 Fed. Reg. 8921 (May 13, 
1971), that established many preservation procedures to which federal agencies must adhere. In 
1996, President Clinton signed Executive Order Nos. 13,006, 61 Fed. Reg. 26071 (May 21, 1996), 
and 13,007, 61 Fed. Reg. 26771 (May 24, 1991), which respectively directed federal agencies to 
locate their offices and facilities in historic districts and properties and articulated the 
Administration’s support for the preservation of Native American sacred sites. In 2003, President 
Bush signed Executive Order No. 13,287, 68 Fed. Reg. 10635 (Mar. 3, 2003), which directed 
federal agencies to advance historic preservation to the degree consistent with the executive branch 
and agencies’ missions and encouraged federal agencies to partner with state, local, and tribal 
governments and private entities to promote economic development through the sustainable use of 
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first of many amendments established the Historic Preservation Fund for 
the NHPA’s preservation grants, expanded the NHPA’s procedural 
protections to include historic sites eligible for listing on the National 
Register of Historic Places, and rendered the Advisory Council on 
Historic Preservation an independent agency.131 The next major 
amendments occurred in 1980 when Congress added Section 110.132 
This new section clarified and expanded the preservation responsibilities 
of federal agencies,133 and other amendments explained the duties of 
State Historic Preservation Officers and directed the Advisory Council 
on Historic Preservation to evaluate federal agencies’ preservation 
policies.134 In 1992, the NHPA was amended again to expand the 
preservation duties of Native Americans and Native Hawaiians.135 The 
1992 amendments also obligated federal agencies to develop internal 
preservation procedures and withhold funding in the event of any 
demolition of historic properties.136 Finally, Congress most recently 
amended the NHPA in 2000 and 2006 to re-authorize both the Historic 
Preservation Fund and the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation.137 
B.  The NHPA’s Text Does Not Indicate that Other Land-Use 
Legislation Controls Historic Preservation Obligations 
In addition to establishing the National Register of Historic Places, 
which receives support from state and local preservation programs as 
well as federal funding and oversight,138 the NHPA governs federal 
agency action with respect to historic properties in two key provisions: 
Section 106139 and Section 110.140 Section 106, included in the original 
                                                     
historic properties. See also KANEFIELD , supra note 20, at 3–4. 
131. NHPA Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-422, 90 Stat. 1313 (codified as amended at 16 
U.S.C. §§ 470b, 470c, 470f, 470h, 470i, 470l–470t (2006)). 
132. NHPA Amendments of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-515, 94 Stat. 2987 (codified as amended at 16 
U.S.C. §§ 469c–2, 470–1, 470a–1, 470a–2, 470h–2, 470h–3, 470u to 470w, 470w–1 to 470w–6 
(2006)). 
133. 16 U.S.C. § 470h–2; see also infra Parts II.B, II.C. 
134. 16 U.S.C. §§ 470u–470w; see also infra Part II.B. 
135. NHPA Amendments of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-575, 106 Stat. 4753 (codified as amended at 
16 U.S.C. §§ 470h–4 to 470h–5, 470x to 470x–6 (2006)). 
136. 16 U.S.C. §§ 470h–2, 470h–4; see also infra Part II.B. 
137. NHPA Amendments of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-208, 114 Stat. 318 (codified as amended at 16 
U.S.C. §§ 470 note, 470a to 470c, 470h, 470h–2, 470n, 470t, 470w, 470w–6, 470x–3 (2006)); 
NHPA Amendments of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-453, 120 Stat. 3367 (codified as amended at 16 
U.S.C. §§ 470 note, 470h, 470i, 470m, 470t, 470v–2 (2006)). 
138. See supra text accompanying notes 22–26, 124–28. 
139. 16 U.S.C. § 470f (2006). 
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text of the NHPA, is a procedural mandate that requires agencies to 
consider the impact of their activities on historic properties and provide 
the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation the opportunity to 
comment on the agency’s activities.141 As Section 106 only establishes a 
consultative process rather than a substantive outcome,142 courts have 
interpreted Section 106 as merely a “stop, look, and listen” statute.143 
Consequently, agencies can engage in activities that will harm historic 
sites so long as they have complied with Section 106’s procedures.144 
However, in 1980, Congress added Section 110 to the NHPA,145 
which arguably heightens the protections agencies must afford to 
historic properties.146 Originally intended to codify an executive order 
that directed federal agencies to preserve and maintain their historic 
properties,147 Section 110’s requirements expand beyond the executive 
order to supplement the NHPA.148 This section requires federal agencies 
                                                     
140. Id. § 470h–2 (2006). 
141. Id. § 470f (“The head of any Federal agency having direct or indirect jurisdiction over a 
proposed Federal or federally assisted undertaking in any State and the head of any Federal 
department or independent agency having authority to license any undertaking shall, prior to the 
approval of the expenditure of any Federal funds on the undertaking or prior to the issuance of any 
license, as the case may be, take into account the effect of the undertaking on any district, site, 
building, structure, or object that is included in or eligible for inclusion in the National Register. The 
head of any such Federal agency shall afford the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation 
established under part B of this subchapter a reasonable opportunity to comment with regard to such 
undertaking.”). 
142. See 3 GEORGE CAMERON COGGINS & ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN, PUBLIC NATURAL 
RESOURCES LAW § 28:10 (2d ed. 2013) (Section 106’s “requirements do not contain an enforceable 
substantive mandate, however. The federal agency need only take into account the effect of an 
action on a listed site to comply.”). 
143. See, e.g., Muckleshoot Indian Tribe v. U.S. Forest Serv., 177 F.3d 800, 805 (9th Cir. 1999); 
Neighborhood Ass’n of The Back Bay, Inc. v. Fed. Transit Admin., 407 F. Supp. 2d 323, 332 (D. 
Mass. 2005), aff’d, 463 F.3d 50 (1st Cir. 2006). 
144. See 3 SALKIN, supra note 120, § 27:3 (“Section 106 does not require agencies to refrain from 
undertakings that will harm historic sites, but merely prescribes a consultative process . . . .”). 
145. See supra note 132. 
146. See KANEFIELD, supra note 20, at 9 (“The review required by Section 110(f) is similar to 
that required under Section 106 but involves a higher standard of care.”). 
147. Exec. Order No. 11,593, 35 Fed. Reg. 8921 (May 13, 1971). 
148. See KANEFIELD, supra note 20, at 9. The relationship between Sections 106 and 110 is not 
settled. At least one district court has held that “Section 110 represents an elucidation and extension 
of the Section 106 process but not its replacement by new and independent substantive obligations 
of a different kind.” Nat’l Trust for Historic Pres. v. Blanck, 938 F. Supp. 908, 920 (D.D.C. 1996). 
This holding was in the context of declaratory and injunctive relief sought to compel the Army to 
assume emergency repairs and stabilization measures of historic sites that were allegedly 
deteriorating due to the Army’s neglect. Id.; see also Lee v. Thornburgh, 877 F.2d 1053, 1056, 1057 
(D.C. Cir. 1989) (concluding that “Congress intended [Section 110] to have a limited reach” not 
beyond Section 106 by relying in part on language from a House Report that stated that the 1980 
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to “assume responsibility for the preservation of historic properties 
which are owned or controlled by such agency.”149 “Each agency [also] 
shall undertake, consistent with the preservation of such properties and 
the mission of the agency and the professional standards established . . . , 
any preservation, as may be necessary to carry out this section.”150 In 
1992, Congress amended Section 110,151 again arguably increasing 
federal agencies’ preservation obligations.152 The amendment clarifies 
that each agency “shall establish . . . a preservation program . . . [that] 
shall ensure” that properties listed on or eligible for listing on the 
National Register of Historic Places “are managed and maintained in a 
way that considers the preservation of their historic, archaeological, 
architectural, and cultural values . . . .”153 Notably, unlike the Wilderness 
Act,154 neither the original text of the NHPA nor any of its subsequent 
amendments include provisions exempting other federal land-use 
statutes from its requirements. 
C.  The Purpose of the NHPA and Its Subsequent Amendments Is to 
Require Agencies to Protect Historic Properties 
In enacting the NHPA in 1966, Congress identified its purpose as: 
“(1) to strengthen and expand the [Historic Sites, Buildings and 
Antiquities Act of 1935] and to establish a national register [of historic 
places] . . . ; (2) to encourage local, regional, State, and National interest 
in the protection of [historic] properties; and (3) to establish an Advisory 
Council on Historic Preservation . . . .”155 When adding Section 110 to 
the NHPA in 1980 on top of Section 106’s consultative process,156 
Congress stated that Section 110 is necessary to: 
clarif[y] and codif[y] the minimum responsibilities expected of 
Federal agencies in carrying out the purposes of this 
Act . . . Section 110(a)(1) requires a Federal agency to assume 
                                                     
Amendments are “not intended to change the preservation responsibilities of Federal agencies as 
required by any other laws, executive orders or regulations”). 
149. 16 U.S.C. § 470h–2(a)(1) (2006).  
150. Id. (emphasis added). 
151. See supra notes 135–36 and accompanying text. 
152. See KANEFIELD, supra note 20, at 9 (“The 1992 amendments to NHPA added greater 
Federal agency responsibility for consideration of historic properties during agency 
decisionmaking.”). 
153. Id. § 470h–2(a)(2)(B) (emphasis added). 
154. See 16 U.S.C. § 1133(a) (2006); see also supra text accompanying notes 86–103. 
155. H.R. REP. NO. 89-1916, at 79 (1966). 
156. See supra Part II.B. 
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preservation responsibilities for properties owned or under the 
control of the agency. It is intended that the degree of 
preservation responsibility be commensurate with the extent of 
the agency’s interest in or control of a particular 
property. . . . Agencies are further directed to undertake such 
preservation as may be necessary . . . .157 
Finally, in its most recent amendments to Section 110,158 Congress 
explained that the modifications were “to clarify and strengthen the 
preservation responsibilities of Federal agencies.”159 
III.  COURTS HAVE INTERPRETED THE WILDERNESS ACT TO 
EXCLUDE HISTORIC PRESERVATION OBLIGATIONS 
The vast majority of the few courts that have interpreted the 
relationship between the Wilderness Act and the NHPA have held that 
the Wilderness Act prohibits historic preservation activities undertaken 
by federal agencies in compliance with the NHPA within wilderness 
areas.160 One court has even stated, “When there is a conflict between 
maintaining the primitive character of the [wilderness] area and between 
any other use . . . the general policy of maintaining the primitive 
character of the area must be supreme.”161 To reach this conclusion, 
courts generally have relied on precedent162 and/or conducted a Chevron 
analysis163 to hold that Congress unambiguously barred an agency’s 
preservation efforts under the Wilderness Act. Courts have thus not 
reviewed the reasonableness of the agency’s action or examined the text, 
purpose, and context of the two acts together.164 
                                                     
157. H.R. REP. NO. 96-1457, at 129 (1980). 
158. See supra Part II.B. 
159. S. REP. NO. 102-336, at 16 (1992). 
160. See infra Parts III.A, III.B. 
161. Minn. Pub. Interest Research Grp. v. Butz, 401 F. Supp. 1276, 1331 (D. Minn. 1975), rev’d 
in part on other grounds, 541 F.2d 1292 (8th Cir. 1976). 
162. See infra Part III.A for a discussion of Wilderness Watch and Public Employees for 
Environmental Responsibility v. Mainella, 375 F.3d 1085 (11th Cir. 2004). 
163. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843–44 (1984) 
(establishing analysis for appropriate level of deference courts should give administrative 
decisions). 
164. See infra Parts III.A, III.B. 
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A.  Wilderness Watch Sets Precedent for the Interaction of the 
Wilderness Act and the NHPA 
The first and oft-cited case165 for the proposition that the Wilderness 
Act excludes historic preservation activities is Wilderness Watch and 
Public Employees for Environmental Responsibility v. Mainella.166 In 
this case, the Park Service organized motorized transportation across 
designated wilderness areas in Cumberland Island, Georgia, to provide 
public tourist access to a Georgian Revival-style mansion and an area 
occupied by freed slaves.167 Both historic sites are listed on the National 
Register of Historic Places168 and are located outside of the wilderness 
area.169 Prior to introducing tourist access to the historic sites, the Park 
Service maintained motorized access to the historic sites to comply with 
its preservation obligations under the NHPA.170 The Eleventh Circuit 
held that the Park Service’s tourist transportation to the historic 
properties unambiguously violated the Wilderness Act.171 To reach this 
conclusion, the court relied on the Wilderness Act’s definition of 
wilderness172 and its prohibition on motorized transport (unless for 
administrative need).173 The court also found that the statute’s purpose 
                                                     
165. See High Sierra Hikers Ass’n v. U.S. Forest Serv., 436 F. Supp. 2d 1117, 1135–36 (E.D. 
Cal. 2006) (noting the only cases that discuss the relationship between structures on National 
Register of Historic Places and wilderness areas as Wilderness Watch and Olympic Park Associates 
v. Mainella, No. C04-5732FDB, 2005 WL 1871114 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 1, 2005)). 
166. 375 F.3d 1085 (11th Cir. 2004). 
167. Id. at 1088–90. 
168. Plum Orchard is a nineteenth century mansion complex commissioned by Thomas Carnegie. 
Id. at 1088 n.3. The Settlement is an area occupied by freed slaves after the Civil War. Id. 
169. Plum Orchard is located just outside of the Cumberland Island wilderness area, and the 
Settlement is located in a potential wilderness area. Id. at 1088. 
170. Id. at 1089. 
171. See id. at 1091–94. After this decision, Congressman Jack Kingston, the congressional 
representative from the district where Cumberland Island is located, successfully removed the road 
used by the Park Service, two smaller roads, and a historic district from the wilderness area via a 
rider to the omnibus federal appropriations bill. See Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2005, Pub. L. 
No. 108-447, § 145, 118 Stat. 2809, 3072–73 (2004). The resulting Cumberland Island Wilderness 
Boundary Adjustment Act of 2004, 16 U.S.C. §§ 459i note, 459i-5, 1132 note (2006), also 
authorized tours of the historic sites on the island. Id.; see also JAMES CHARLES SMITH, EDWARD J. 
LARSON, JOHN COPELAND NAGLE & JOHN A. KIDWELL, PROPERTY: CASES & MATERIALS 784 (2d 
ed. 2008). 
172. See Wilderness Watch, 375 F.3d at 1091–92 (“The Wilderness Act defines wilderness as 
‘undeveloped Federal land retaining its primeval character and influence, without permanent 
improvements or human habitation’ . . . [that] should ‘generally appear[] to have been affected 
primarily by the forces of nature, with the imprint of man’s work substantially unnoticeable.’”) 
(quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1131(c) (2006)).  
173. See id. at 1092 (“The Wilderness Act bars the use of motor vehicles in these areas ‘except as 
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prohibits the Park Service’s tourist transportation to the historic sites 
because that transportation interferes with a “primitive wilderness 
experience.”174 Though the court did acknowledge that the Wilderness 
Act provides for historical use,175 it concluded that “[g]iven the 
consistent evocation of ‘untrammeled’ and ‘natural’ areas, the previous 
pairing of ‘historical’ with ‘ecological’ and ‘geological’ features, and the 
explicit prohibition on structures, the only reasonable reading of 
‘historical use’ in the Wilderness Act refers to natural, rather than man-
made, features.”176 
Although the Wilderness Watch court does hold that the Wilderness 
Act precludes motorized tourist access to historic sites, the decision 
carefully leaves room for historic preservation within wilderness areas 
under the NHPA.177 For example, after determining that “historical use” 
as provided for in the Wilderness Act refers to natural features, the court 
acknowledged, “Of course, Congress may separately provide for the 
preservation of an existing historical structure within a wilderness area, 
as it has done through the NHPA.”178 The court then clarified that “[t]his 
appeal turns not on the preservation of historical structures but on the 
decision to provide motorized public access to them across designated 
wilderness areas.”179 Moreover, while holding that “the Wilderness 
Act . . . unambiguously prohibit[s] the Park Service from offering 
motorized transportation to park visitors through the wilderness area,”180 
the court made no mention of the Park Service’s motorized transport 
across the wilderness area for the purpose of maintaining the historic 
sites. 
B.  Later Federal District Court Cases Follow Wilderness Watch’s 
Reasoning to Conclude that the Wilderness Act Precludes Historic 
Preservation Activities 
Olympic Park Associates v. Mainella181 was the first case to cite the 
                                                     
necessary to meet minimum requirements for the administration of the area for the purpose of this 
chapter [the Wilderness Act].’”) (alteration in original) (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1133(c)). 
174. Id. at 1093. 
175. See id. at 1092 (“Section 1133(b) mentions ‘historical use’ along with ‘recreational, scenic, 
scientific, educational, [and] conservation’ uses.”) (alteration in original). 
176. Id. 
177. See id. 
178. Id. 
179. Id. (emphasis added). 
180. Id. at 1094. 
181. No. C04-5732FDB, 2005 WL 1871114 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 1, 2005). 
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Wilderness Watch court’s holding regarding the Wilderness Act squarely 
with regard to the NHPA. This case involved a challenge under the 
Wilderness Act to the Park Service’s decision to rebuild two collapsed 
snow shelters in the Olympic Wilderness of Washington State with new 
and original materials.182 Both snow shelters, though not listed, were 
eligible for listing on the National Register of Historic Places.183 The 
district court held that the Park Service’s decision violated the 
Wilderness Act because of the Act’s purpose,184 definition of 
wilderness,185 and proscription against structures (except for 
emergencies).186 To support its holding, the court also cited the pivotal 
language from Wilderness Watch regarding the goals of the Wilderness 
Act and the meaning of the Act’s reference to “historical use”: 
  As an initial matter, we cannot agree with the Park Service 
that the preservation of historical structures furthers the goals of 
the Wilderness Act. The Park Service’s responsibilities for the 
historic preservation of Plum Orchard and the settlement derive, 
not from the Wilderness Act, but rather from the National 
Historic Preservation Act. The NHPA requires agencies to 
“assume responsibility for the preservation of historic 
properties” they control. 
  The agency’s obligations under the Wilderness Act are quite 
different. . . . As the Park Service notes, Section 1133(b) [of the 
Wilderness Act] mentions “historical use” along with 
“recreational, scenic, scientific, educational, [and] conservation” 
uses. However, this list tracks the definition of wilderness areas 
in § 1131(c), which describes “a primitive and unconfined type 
of recreation” and “ecological, geological, or other features of 
scientific, educational, scenic, or historical value.” Given the 
consistent evocation of “untrammeled” and “natural” areas, the 
previous pairing of “historical” with “ecological” and 
“geological” features, and the explicit prohibition on structures, 
the only reasonable reading of “historical use” in the Wilderness 
Act refers to natural, rather than man-made features.187 
                                                     
182. See id. at *1–2. 
183. See id. The court nowhere mentions that the shelters’ eligibility for listing on the National 
Register of Historic Places, rather than being listed, affected its analysis. 
184. See id. at *3 (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1131(a) (2006)). 
185. See id. at *4 (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1131(c)). 
186. See id. at *4 (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1133(c)), *5. 
187. See id. at *6 (internal citations omitted) (quoting Wilderness Watch & Pub. Emps. for Envtl. 
Responsibility v. Mainella, 375 F.3d 1085, 1091–92 (11th Cir. 2004)). 
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The Olympic Park court concluded that the designation of the 
Olympic Wilderness changed the analysis regarding permissible historic 
preservation activities—and these activities no longer included the 
reconstruction of historic snow shelters.188 While the court quoted some 
of the language from Wilderness Watch, it did not include the exceptions 
the Eleventh Circuit cited in which Congress provided for the protection 
of historic structures under the NHPA.189 Moreover, the Olympic Park 
court did not cite the Eleventh Circuit’s clarification that its holding 
precluded only motorized tourist transportation across wilderness areas 
and not the preservation of historic structures per se.190 According to the 
Olympic Park court, the snow shelters’ eligibility for listing on the 
National Register of Historic Places was a conclusion based on “the 
history of their original construction and use . . . .”191 With the Olympic 
National Park’s designation as wilderness, “a different perspective on 
the land is required . . . [which] means ‘land retaining its primitive 
character and influence, without permanent improvements or human 
habitation, which is protected and managed so as to preserve its natural 
conditions.’”192 
However, the court did not acknowledge the fact that the Washington 
State Office of Archaeology and Historic Preservation deemed the 
shelters eligible for listing on the National Register of Historic Places 
notwithstanding their collapse193 and made this determination over ten 
years after Congress formally designated the Olympic Wilderness as 
wilderness.194 Similarly, other than referencing the Wilderness Act’s 
definition of wilderness and the duties of agencies under the Act,195 the 
court did not discuss the compromises involved in the Wilderness Act’s 
                                                     
188. Id. at *6–7. 
189. See supra text accompanying notes 177–78. 
190. See supra text accompanying note 179. 
191. Olympic Park, 2005 WL 1871114, at *6. 
192. Id. (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1131(c) (2006)). 
193. See id. at *2. 
194. See id. at *1–2. Congress formally designated the Olympic Wilderness as wilderness in 
1988, and the shelters were found eligible for placement on the National Register of Historic Places 
on January 11, 2001. Id. 
195. Later, the Olympic Park court cited the provision of the Wilderness Act that specifies 
agencies’ responsibilities under the Act. Id. at *7 (“[E]ach agency administering any area designated 
as wilderness shall be responsible for preserving the wilderness character of the area and shall so 
administer such area for such other purposes for which it may have been established as also to 
preserve its wilderness character.”) (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1133(b)). However, the court did not 
include the next sentence in this provision of the Wilderness Act that provides, “[W]ilderness areas 
shall be devoted to the public purposes of recreational, scenic, scientific, educational, conservation, 
and historical use.” 16 U.S.C. § 1133(b). 
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enactment196 or the Act’s exemption of historic preservation statutes.197 
Instead, the court asserted that neither the NHPA198 nor other historic 
preservation statutes199 that the Park Service administers require 
reconstruction.200 Finally, the court applied the canon of statutory 
construction in which a specific provision governs a general provision, 
concluding without analysis that “the Wilderness Act[,] under which the 
Olympic Wilderness was designated, is the specific provision, while the 
National Historic Preservation Act . . . is the general.”201 
High Sierra Hikers Ass’n v. U.S. Forest Service202 similarly cited 
Wilderness Watch to conclude that the Wilderness Act prohibited 
historic preservation activities within wilderness areas.203 In High Sierra 
Hikers, a district court found that the Forest Service’s decision to repair, 
maintain, and operate small, visually integrated dams located within the 
Emigrant Wilderness in the Sierra Nevada mountains in California was 
“clearly and unambiguously contrary to the provisions of the Wilderness 
Act.”204 Some of the dams the Forest Service’s proposal covered were 
eligible for listing on the National Register of Historic Places.205 
Although the court gave deference to the Forest Service’s determination 
that some of the dams qualified as historic sites and that maintenance of 
those dams would “preserve their historic value,”206 the court 
nonetheless concluded that the Wilderness Act did not permit the 
                                                     
196. See supra Part I.A. 
197. See supra Part I.C. 
198. See Olympic Park, 2005 WL 1871114, at *7 (noting that Section 110 of the NHPA does not 
create substantive obligations beyond the NHPA’s procedural requirements) (citing Nat’l Trust for 
Historic Pres. v. Blanck, 938 F. Supp. 908, 922 (D.D.C. 1996), aff’d per curium, 203 F.3d 53 (D.C. 
Cir. 1999)). The Olympic Park court also cited United States v. 162.20 Acres of Land, More or Less, 
Situated in Clay Cnty., State of Miss., 639 F.2d 299 (5th Cir. 1981), for this proposition. Id. 
However, the 162.20 Acres of Land court does not discuss Section 110 of the NHPA; rather, it 
contemplates the meaning of Section 106 review. 639 F.2d at 302–04. 
199. See Olympic Park, 2005 WL 1871114, at *7. 
200. As discussed in supra note 148, the obligations of administering agencies under Section 110 
of the NHPA are arguably unclear. Although at least two courts have concluded that Section 110 
does not include any additional mandates beyond Section 106’s procedural requirements, the 
context, plain meaning, and purpose of the NHPA do not compel this result. See infra Part IV.A. 
201. See Olympic Park, 2005 WL 1871114, at *8. The court does not discuss why the Wilderness 
Act is more specific than the shelters’ eligibility for placement on the National Register of Historic 
Places under the NHPA. Id. 
202. 436 F. Supp. 2d 1117 (E.D. Cal. 2006). 
203. Id. at 1135. 
204. Id. at 1132. 
205. See id. at 1127–28. 
206. Id. at 1133. 
12 - Carsley Article.docx (Do Not Delete) 6/17/2013  1:58 PM 
550 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 88:525 
 
dams.207 
For support, in addition to referencing Olympic Park, the High Sierra 
Hikers court cited the same passage of Wilderness Watch that the 
Olympic Park court highlighted, which defined the Wilderness Act’s 
provision for historical use to refer to natural, not human-made, 
features.208 As in the Olympic Park decision, the High Sierra Hikers 
court also did not cite the parts of the Wilderness Watch decision that 
recognize Congress’s intent to provide for the protection of historic 
structures within wilderness areas through the NHPA or that cabin the 
court’s decision to motorized tourist transportation, not historic 
preservation.209 Moreover, the High Sierra Hikers court did not refer to 
the Wilderness Act’s provision for historic preservation statutes,210 the 
compromises that led to the Wilderness Act’s passage,211 or the Forest 
Service’s obligations under the NHPA.212 Rather, the court determined 
that “[a]bsent a declaration by Congress of the need to restore and 
preserve the dam structures in recognition of their historical significance, 
there is nothing the court can point to that would authorize such an 
action where the maintenance of the dams would otherwise . . . conflict 
with the Wilderness Act.”213 
IV.  BECAUSE COURTS HAVE REACHED CONFLICTING 
RESULTS, CONGRESS SHOULD AMEND THE WILDERNESS 
ACT TO EXPLICITLY PROVIDE FOR HISTORIC 
PRESERVATION ACTIVITIES 
Although appellate and lower courts have consistently interpreted the 
Wilderness Act to exclude preservation activities under the NHPA 
within wilderness areas,214 this outcome is not ideal, and it is not 
                                                     
207. Id. at 1134. The court reasoned that fisheries enhancement (the purpose of the dams) is not 
an activity “necessary to meet minimum requirements for the administration of the area for the 
purpose of [the Wilderness Act]” to overcome the Wilderness Act’s general prohibition on 
structures and installations. Id. (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1133(c) (2006)). 
208. See id. at 1135 (quoting Wilderness Watch & Pub. Emps. for Envtl. Responsibility v. 
Mainella, 375 F.3d 1085, 1092 (11th Cir. 2004)); supra text accompanying note 187. 
209. See supra text accompanying notes 177–79. 
210. See supra Part I.C. 
211. See supra Part I.A. 
212. See supra Part II.B.  
213. High Sierra Hikers Ass’n, 436 F. Supp. 2d at 1136. The court does not explain why the 
dam’s eligibility for listing on the National Register of Historic Places is not sufficient to 
accomplish such a declaration. 
214. See supra Part III; see also Appel, supra note 17, at 277 (using statistical analysis to “find[] 
that the judicial decisions show a pattern of having a pro-wilderness bent”). 
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required by the statutes215 or Wilderness Watch. Rather, longstanding 
canons of statutory interpretation support reconciling the apparent 
conflicts between two statutes,216 which prevents courts from defaulting 
to general interpretive aids to render a decision.217 When applied to the 
Wilderness Act and the NHPA, these canons lead to the conclusion that 
historic preservation activities should be permitted within wilderness 
areas. However, because lower courts have not reached this result, 
Congress should amend the Wilderness Act to explicitly provide for 
preservation efforts under the NHPA. 
A.  Wilderness Watch Does Not Prohibit Historic Preservation Efforts 
Within Wilderness Areas 
Lower courts’ incomplete citation to Wilderness Watch to support 
their unanimous conclusion that the Wilderness Act prohibits historic 
preservation activities in compliance with the NHPA within wilderness 
areas218 is inaccurate and misleading. A careful reading of the decision 
reveals the Wilderness Watch court’s nuanced understanding that the 
NHPA is the mechanism through which Congress has permitted the 
preservation of historic structures located within wilderness lands.219 The 
court states, “Congress may separately provide for the preservation of an 
                                                     
215. See 2B NORMAN J. SINGER & J.D. SHAMBIE SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY 
CONSTRUCTION § 51:2 (7th ed. 2012) (“Courts try to construe apparently conflicting statutes on the 
same subject harmoniously, and, if possible, give effect to every provision in both.”). 
216. See Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 662–63 (2007) 
(refusing to find implied statutory repeal unless expressly stated or necessary); Watt v. Alaska, 451 
U.S. 259, 266–67 (1981) (attempting to ascertain Congress’s intent in two applicable statutes before 
resorting to general rule of applying more recent statute). 
217. These general rules are numerous and include such maxims as applying the more recent 
statute when two conflicting statutes govern, see 2B SINGER & SINGER, supra note 215, § 51.2 (“To 
the extent that an older statute conflicts with a more recent statute, the older statute must yield to the 
more recent statute as the latest expression of legislative intent.”), and applying the more specific 
statute over a general statute when both control, see Olympic Park Assocs. v. Mainella, No. C04-
5732FDB, 2005 WL 1871114, at *8 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 1, 2005). If either of these general rules 
were applied to the Wilderness Act and the NHPA, the result is unclear. For example, the NHPA 
may control due to its enactment two years after the Wilderness Act, as well as its several 
amendments; however, if the date in which the structure was listed on the National Register of 
Historic Places was compared to the date of the designation of the wilderness area where it is 
located, the Wilderness Act may control. Similarly, it is not clear which statute is more specific. For 
these types of reasons, the U.S. Supreme Court first attempts to reconcile the text and congressional 
intent of two equally applicable statutes before defaulting to general rules of interpretation. See 
cases cited supra note 216. 
218. See supra Part III.B. 
219. Wilderness Watch & Pub. Emps. for Envtl. Responsibility v. Mainella, 375 F.3d 1085, 1092 
(11th Cir. 2004); see supra Part III.A. 
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existing historical structure within a wilderness area, as it has done 
through the NHPA.”220 The court then clarifies the narrowness of its 
holding: the decision found that the Wilderness Act only prohibits the 
Park Service’s motorized tourist transportation across the wilderness 
area, not the Park Service’s historic preservation activities.221 However, 
when citing this decision, lower courts have yet to acknowledge the 
specific caveat that the Wilderness Watch court provides for historic 
preservation, let alone consider the text, purpose, and context of the 
NHPA and Wilderness Act together.222 
B.  The Plain Meaning, Purpose, and Context of Both the Wilderness 
Act and the NHPA Permit Historic Preservation Within Wilderness 
Areas 
It is well accepted that if the meaning of a statute and the legislature’s 
intent are clear and reasonable on their face, courts are to give effect to 
the statute’s language without resorting to materials outside of that 
text.223 In so doing, courts consider the statutory provision at issue224 and 
the statute in its entirety,225 giving effect to each word the legislature 
included.226 
Because the Wilderness Act explicitly recognizes the significance of 
history, application of this canon of statutory construction indicates that 
an outright prohibition of historical efforts within wilderness areas 
would be error. The Act’s definition of wilderness allows designated 
wilderness areas to “contain ecological, geological, or other features of 
scientific, educational, scenic, or historical value.”227 The definition also 
clarifies that a wilderness area “generally appears to have been affected 
                                                     
220. Wilderness Watch, 375 F.3d at 1092 (emphasis added). 
221. See id. (“This appeal turns not on the preservation of historical structures but on the decision 
to provide motorized public access to them across designated wilderness areas.”). 
222. See supra Part III.B. 
223. See Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917) (“It is elementary that the meaning 
of a statute must, in the first instance, be sought in the language in which the act is framed, and if 
that is plain, and if the law is within the constitutional authority of the lawmaking body which 
passed it, the sole function of the courts is to enforce it according to its terms.”); see also 2A SINGER 
& SINGER, supra note 215, § 46.1. 
224. See 2A SINGER & SINGER, supra note 215, § 47.2. 
225. See id. § 46:5 (“A statute is passed as a whole and not in parts or sections and is animated by 
one general purpose and intent.”). 
226. See United States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 538–39 (1955) (“It is our duty ‘to give effect, 
if possible, to every clause and word of a statute’ . . . .”) (citation omitted); see also 2A SINGER & 
SINGER, supra note 215, § 46.6. 
227. 16 U.S.C. § 1131(c)(4) (2006) (emphasis added). 
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primarily by the forces of nature, with the imprint of man’s work 
substantially unnoticeable.”228 These parts of the definition of wilderness 
are significant for three reasons. First, they indicate that Congress did 
not intend to confine wilderness strictly to pristine areas without any 
human impact whatsoever. Had Congress intended such a result, instead 
of including language for interests other than pure conservation,229 it 
should have ended the definition of wilderness with “an area of 
undeveloped Federal land retaining its primeval character and influence, 
without permanent improvements or human habitation . . . .”230 Second, 
the location of these provisions is important.231 Congress identified in 
the definition section at the beginning of the statute that the standard for 
wilderness is flexible. Third, the inclusion of “historical value” explicitly 
leaves room for historic preservation. 
In addition to the Wilderness Act’s definition of wilderness, both the 
stated uses of wilderness areas and the Act’s instructions to agencies 
responsible for their administration encompass historic preservation. 
Section 1133(b) of the Wilderness Act provides: 
Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, each agency 
administering any area designated as wilderness shall be 
responsible for preserving the wilderness character of the area 
and shall so administer such area for such other purposes for 
which it may have been established as also to preserve its 
wilderness character. Except as otherwise provided in this 
chapter, wilderness areas shall be devoted to the public purposes 
of recreational, scenic, scientific, educational, conservation, and 
historical use.232 
Just as the definition of wilderness leaves room for historic 
preservation, the Wilderness Act clarifies that administering agencies 
should manage wilderness areas in accordance with both the Wilderness 
Act’s directives and other established purposes. When a historic place 
listed on the National Register of Historic Places—and therefore within 
the ambit of the NHPA’s protections—is located within a wilderness 
area, this is precisely the situation in which Section 1133(b) allows an 
agency to also fulfill an alternative competing demand. If there were any 
                                                     
228. Id. § 1131(c)(1) (emphasis added). 
229. See, e.g., id. § 1131(c)(4). 
230. Id. § 1131(c). If Congress had adopted such a restrictive definition of wilderness, little land 
would qualify for designation as wilderness. 
231. See 2A SINGER & SINGER, supra note 215, § 47.7 (“As a rule, a definition which declares 
what a term means is binding upon the court.”). 
232. 16 U.S.C. § 1133(b) (emphasis added). 
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doubt about the meaning of allowing administration of wilderness areas 
for other established purposes, Section 1133(a)(3)’s exception for the 
major historic preservation statutes in existence in 1964 confirms that 
historic preservation efforts are “such other purposes” of wilderness 
areas. 
To further substantiate this intent, Congress even identified in Section 
1133(b) that one of the public purposes of wilderness areas is historical 
use. It is not unreasonable to interpret “historical use” to include public 
historic preservation efforts in compliance with the NHPA as these 
efforts enhance the “recreational, scenic, scientific, educational, [and] 
conservation . . . use[s]” 233 of wilderness. The Ninth Circuit recognized 
as much when concluding: 
The [Wilderness] Act also states that the “agency administering 
any area designated as wilderness” must “administer such area 
for such other purposes for which it may have been established 
as also to preserve its wilderness character.” Had Congress 
stopped there, these strongly worded phrases would have 
suggested that wilderness areas were to remain untouched—not 
merely untouched by development but, literally, untouched by 
humans. But Congress did not mandate that the [U.S. Fish and 
Wildlife] Service preserve the wilderness in a museum diorama, 
one that we might observe only from a safe distance, behind a 
brass railing and a thick glass window. Instead, Congress stated 
that the wilderness was to be preserved as wilderness and made 
accessible to people, “devoted to the public purposes of 
recreational, scenic, scientific, educational, conservation, and 
historical use.” Congress was specific about what it understood 
might be necessary to preserve the wilderness for such public 
purposes. Congress expressly authorized structures, motorized 
vehicles, and temporary roads if such things are necessary to 
meet the minimum requirements for administering the area; 
indeed, the Act permits, under certain circumstances, aircraft 
and motorboat use and even mining. Those uses are 
incompatible with a museum notion of wilderness.234 
Additionally, Congress explained that the Wilderness Act should 
supplement other applicable land-use statutes. Specifically, the Act 
states that its “purposes . . . are hereby declared to be within and 
supplemental to the purposes for which national forests and units of the 
                                                     
233. Id. 
234. Wilderness Watch, Inc. v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 629 F.3d 1024, 1033 (9th Cir. 2010) 
(emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
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national park and national wildlife refuge systems are established and 
administered . . . .”235 
Further, the designation of any area of any park, monument, or 
other unit of the national park system as a wilderness 
area . . . shall in no manner lower the standards evolved for the 
use and preservation of such park, monument, or other unit of 
the national park system in accordance with . . . any other Act of 
Congress which might pertain to or affect such area, including, 
but not limited to, [the historic preservation statutes existing in 
1964].236 
Historic sites listed on the National Register of Historic Places are 
included within this provision from the Wilderness Act as “units” of the 
national park system.237 Even if there were ambiguity, this provision 
alternatively covers historic places as monuments protected under 
another act of Congress: the NHPA. Most important is the fact that the 
Wilderness Act itself identifies historic preservation statutes as being 
unaffected by the Wilderness Act. This caveat protects historic 
preservation activities in compliance with the NHPA within wilderness 
areas.238 This explicit directive to respect the preservation of monuments 
under other federal land-use statutes becomes meaningless when the 
Wilderness Act is read to categorically trump the NHPA. 
Moreover, the Wilderness Act’s exceptions reflect Congress’s 
tolerance for activities that could reasonably be considered less 
consistent with pristine wilderness than historic preservation efforts. For 
example, when “necessary to meet minimum requirements for the 
administration of the [wilderness] area,” temporary roads, the use of 
motor vehicles, motorized equipment or motorboats, landing of aircraft, 
other forms of mechanical transport, and structures or installations are 
permitted within wilderness areas.239 Possibly even more at odds with 
primeval wilderness are the Wilderness Act’s exceptions for existing 
private rights, commercial enterprises, and permanent roads.240 These 
exceptions permit certain aircraft use, mining activities, livestock 
grazing, and power projects.241 Such activities have a far more dramatic 
                                                     
235. 16 U.S.C. § 1133(a) (emphasis added). 
236. Id. § 1133(a)(3) (emphasis added). 
237. The National Register of Historic Places is administered through the Park Service as part of 
the national park system. See 16 U.S.C. § 470(a) (2006); 36 C.F.R. § 60 (2012). 
238. See 16 U.S.C. § 1133(a); see also supra Part I.C. 
239. 16 U.S.C. § 1133(c). 
240. Id.  
241. Id. § 1133(d). 
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impact on wilderness than the preservation of an existing structure, and 
Congress’s tolerance for them further indicates the reasonableness of 
reading the text of the Wilderness Act to include historic preservation 
activities. 
An examination of the plain meaning of the NHPA similarly reveals 
that agencies’ historic preservation obligations are not trumped by other 
land-use policies. In addition to a consultation process,242 Section 110 of 
the NHPA declares that “all Federal agencies shall assume responsibility 
for the preservation of historic properties which are owned or controlled 
by such agency. . . . Each agency shall undertake . . . any preservation, 
as may be necessary . . . .”243 Some courts have held that this provision 
does not affirmatively require preservation, finding Section 110 to be 
merely an extension of the NHPA’s consultation requirements.244 The 
plain language of Section 110, however, does not support this 
interpretation. While the NHPA’s consultation obligations do not 
compel a pro-preservation outcome, Section 110 uses the mandatory 
language of “shall” in describing agencies’ preservation obligations and 
does not include any exceptions for other land-use policies, i.e., 
wilderness protection. 
The purposes of the Wilderness Act and the NHPA also allow the two 
acts to be reconciled. The Wilderness Act specifies that its purpose is “to 
secure for the American people of present and future generations the 
benefits of an enduring resource of wilderness.”245 In so doing, the Act 
does not identify or imply that wilderness values trump all others once 
land is so designated. In fact, the Act permits activities that directly 
conflict with the idea of untrammeled land.246 The purpose of the 
original NHPA was to “encourage” the protection of historic 
properties.247 Although “encouraging” historic preservation does not 
seem to necessarily mandate any preservation activities, in subsequent 
amendments, Congress has clarified that the purpose of these 
amendments is to “strengthen the preservation responsibilities of Federal 
agencies.”248 As neither of the acts specifies that one value controls 
when the two values conflict, each act provides ample room for 
harmonization with the other. 
                                                     
242. Id. § 470f. 
243. Id. § 470h–2(a)(1) (emphasis added). 
244. See supra notes 148, 198. 
245. 16 U.S.C. § 1131(a). 
246. See supra Parts I.A, I.C. 
247. H.R. REP. NO. 89-1916, at 79 (1966). 
248. S. REP. NO. 102-336, at 16 (1992). 
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Finally, the historical contexts of both acts do not evince a 
congressional intent to interpret the Wilderness Act as excluding the 
NHPA. Although some courts refuse to consider the broader context of a 
statute unless the statute is ambiguous or unclear, other courts more 
liberally consider extrinsic sources that might aid in accurately 
understanding the statute.249 Thus, some courts may require a finding 
that the Wilderness Act and/or the NHPA is ambiguous in respect to 
historic preservation within wilderness areas to consider the context of 
the statutes’ enactments. 
Both the pre-enactment and enactment context of the Wilderness Act 
and the NHPA support reading the acts together to conclude that they 
provide for historic preservation within wilderness areas. Although the 
Wilderness Act was an unprecedented piece of conservation legislation, 
its enactment was hard fought and resulted in significant weakening of 
the proposed bill.250 The examples of compromise are numerous251 and 
demonstrate a willingness to accept multiple uses of wilderness land 
rather than forgo wilderness protection altogether. If wilderness 
supporters were willing to accept concessions as great as mining and 
roadway construction, it is difficult to argue against historic preservation 
activities such as the rebuilding of two isolated snow shelters or the 
maintenance of visually unobtrusive dams. Similarly, the NHPA’s 
several amendments since its original enactment, each serving to 
strengthen its commands, do not support the wholesale exclusion of its 
application within wilderness areas. 
C.  Congress Should Accept the High Sierra Hikers Court’s Invitation 
to Amend the Wilderness Act to Expressly Permit Historic 
Preservation Within Wilderness Areas 
Because it does not appear that courts are likely to change direction in 
cases interpreting the relationship between the Wilderness Act and the 
NHPA, Congress should amend the Wilderness Act to explicitly provide 
for historic preservation efforts within wilderness areas. To do so, 
Congress should amend Section 1133(a)(3) of the Wilderness Act and 
expressly name the NHPA as a statute with which the Wilderness Act 
                                                     
249. See 2A SINGER & SINGER, supra note 215, § 48:1 (“While it is acknowledged that there 
should be some facial statutory ambiguity before a court considers extrinsic evidence of legislative 
intent, it has also been noted that there should not be a slavish adherence to this principle where it is 
obvious that the result reached will be a clear distortion of legislative purpose.”). 
250. See supra Part I.A. 
251. See supra Part I.A. 
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does not conflict. This amendment alone would suffice to protect 
historic preservation efforts within wilderness lands. To ensure historic 
preservation is permitted, however, Congress should also add another 
subsection to Section 1131(c), the definition of wilderness. The new 
subsection should state that wilderness areas may also contain historic 
sites protected and managed under federal historic preservation statutes 
so as to preserve their historic value. 
CONCLUSION 
Congress passed the Wilderness Act with the recognition that it would 
not be the only statute applied to wilderness lands and that even lands 
“untrammeled by man, where man himself is a visitor who does not 
remain” have value beyond that of wilderness. Thus, Congress provided 
for concurrent and competing uses of wilderness in the text of the 
Wilderness Act and specified that the Act would be supplemental to—
not exclusive of—other land-use statutes. Since the Wilderness Act’s 
passage, Congress has continued to strengthen protections for 
preservation of historic sites. Although the purposes of the Wilderness 
Act include recreational, scenic, scientific, educational, conservation, 
and historical uses of wilderness lands, the full spectrum of these 
purposes has yet to be realized. 
Fortunately, even absent congressional amendment, the Wilderness 
Act’s purposes can be reconciled with the purposes of other land-use 
statutes. Not only would this interpretation conform to both the letter and 
spirit of the Wilderness Act, but it would give other land-use statutes, 
including the NHPA, the effects that they were intended to have. With 
the Wilderness Act and the NHPA harmonized, future Americans and 
other visitors will be able to enjoy not just “wilderness in a museum 
diorama,” but wilderness as a larger part of history. 
 
